University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of
Sciences and Affiliated Societies

Nebraska Academy of Sciences

1973

Cognitive Egocentricity of the Child Within Piagetian
Developmental Theory
Violet Kalyan-Masih
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas

Kalyan-Masih, Violet, "Cognitive Egocentricity of the Child Within Piagetian Developmental Theory" (1973).
Transactions of the Nebraska Academy of Sciences and Affiliated Societies. 379.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/tnas/379

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Nebraska Academy of Sciences at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Transactions of the
Nebraska Academy of Sciences and Affiliated Societies by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

HI JIA VIOl{AL SelL 'JC1S

COGNITIVE EGOCENTRICITY OF THE CHILD
\\ lTHIN PIAGETlAN DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY I
Viulet Kalyan-\lasih
IJt'p:lflJnent of lIuman Development and the Family,
L'niver,ity of Nebraska, Lincoln, 68503.

In p,,1pular usage of the term, an egocentric person is a conceited and
bUJSlful il1,lividual who is preoccupied with his own self-importance. There is,
however, a fundamental difference between the cognitive egocentricity of a
child as lk:'incc! by Piaget, and the egocentricity of an adult as is commonly
understuod, A child is egocentric because he cannot take someone else's point
of view: an adul t is egocentric because he will not - in one case, it is cognitive
inability: in llie: otiler, social insensitivity. "Cognitive egocentrism," according
to Piag~t. .,
stems from a lack of differentiation between one's own point
of view and I he ot her pussible ones ... " (11 ,p.4). Decentering is defined as
the "ability 10 shift mental perspective, in social relationships as well as in
others." (11 ,p.8) Egocentricity may also be defined as "the inability to
dcccntcL to shin the given cognitive perspective (manque de de'centration)."
(II ,p.]) Piaget has jLlstified the use of the term "egocentrism" as opposed to
"centrism" becaLlse "the initial centering of perspective is always relative to
one's OWJI positioll and action ... " (11 ,p,3)
All dlildren are egocentric as they pass through the Piagetian cognitive
continuum. Egocentrism is a developmental necessity which the child cannot
escape. It is as unconscious as it is natural. It is a cognitive mode of dealing
with reality, dillerent at each developmental level. This term has been the
most criticized and least understood of Piaget's concepts, but he has "insisted
upon its epistemological meaning . . . rather than on its popular or 'moral'
meaning." (15 ,p.118) At one point, however, even Piaget succumbed to the
mounting criticism and stated:

We no longer call it "egocentric," as one of us once did, in deference to the
criticisms from many psychologists who arc still not familiar with the practice in the
exact sciences of using a term only in accordance with the definitions proposed,
irrespectih' of its popular meanings and associations. (15 ,p.61 , footnote 6)

1 Published a, Paper number 3664, Journal Series: Nebraska Agricultural Experiment
Station,
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Pinard and Laurendeau, however, engaged in replicating Piagetian
research on large samples in Canada, Africa, and other places report: " ... it
seems reasonable to conclude that, at least in the development of projective
spatial concepts, the egocentric attitude is regular enough to suggest that it
reflects a genuine and consistent form of mental organization." (4,p.436)
It matters little what we call it: egocentricity, or cognitive egocentricity,
or Piagetian egocentricity, or X-egocentricity. The important point is that it is
significant enough not to be dismissed easily. Broadly speaking, cognitive
egocentricity is a lack of differentiation between self and nonself; between
subjective and objective; between psychological and physical; or it is an
imbalance between assimilation and accommodation. In one of his books,
Piaget defines it as:
•.. primacy of self-satisfaction over objective recognition ... and on the other,
distortion of reality to satisfy the activity and point of view of the individuaL In both
cases it is unconscious, being essentially the result of failure to distinguish between the
subjective and the objective. (1 O,p.285)

Egocentricity is decentered when differentiation between the two
polarities is achieved.
There are various aspects of cognitive egocentricity as the child moves
along the Piagetian cognitive continuum through four developmental
sequences; sensory motor (birth - 2 + years); preoperational (2 - 7 + years);
concrete operational (7 - 11 + years); and formal operational (11 - 15 +
years).

Sensory motor egocentrism (birth - 2 years)
At the beginning of postnatal life, the neonate is directly egocentric.
According to Piaget, ". . . consciousness starts with an unconscious and
integral egocentricity," (14,p.13) where self is at the center of reality, but is
not aware of itself. "Psychoa~alysis has called this ... "narcissism," but it is
important to understand that it is a narcissism without Narcissus, i. e.,
without any sense of personal awareness as such." (14,p.16) For the neonate,
then, the self and the nonself are undifferentiated and globaL The universe of
the neonate, so to speak, is centered on his own body and on his own
movements.
During the next few months, the infant becomes indirectly egocentric,
that is, the focus now shifts from his own body to objects around him. Also,
the activity primarily centered on his own body now extends to objects in the
environment. For example, the thumb-sucking (action centered on his own
body) now extends to sucking anything the hand can grasp.
The next important step in the decentering of cognitive egocentricity is
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, 'Cllllcitillli uf object permanence, When an infant searches for a hidden
tlJC ,Il"
. -'
"
"
,
ubject. it !11JV be mierred that, lur the mfant, the object contmues to eXIst
. 'I' 'Ilckntlv \)1 hIS perceptual actIvIty or perceptual fIeld, ThIs behaVIOr
I11C L pl
'
'Iso ,ug~C5h that some diCi'erentiation between self and nonself has taken
'~LtCL" " . • ' the construction of sulid and permanent objects is the first
I.. pi,' ,,1' the transitiun from primitive total egocentricity to the final
L'x,lIll t' ~
eiaburatiun (,fan external universe," (14,p,14)
The evolution of practical space helps further in the decentering process,
The unc\)Ordillatcd sensory spaces (oral, visual, and tactile) on the neonate's
1'\1'11 bodv and centered on his own movements gradually develop into a
practical space furnished with permanent objects, The ease of locomotion in
the surruUmilI1!:, space during the second year of life also helps the child to
c(lurdinalc his own displacements as well as the displacements of other
objects, I Ierl' again, self is the reference point. The relationships and
cli~plaCCIllCIl L; ~lre first coordinated between self and other objects, and only
bter between ('lle object and another object.
Piagct also refers to the primitive precausal egocentricity of the infant as
"lllagico-phclluJllenalistic," "Phenomenalistic" because two events contiguous
in time and space are causally linked; "magico" because the infant almost
appears to have a magical belief in his own activity as the casual agent. For
cxample, when an infant pulls at the cords of a toy hanging above his crib,
almost anticipating and hoping to produce an event at a distance, it is inferred
that he has a magical belief in his own efficacy or that feelings and longings
are sufficient to bring about an event. By the end of the second year of life,
however, the child begins to understand the necessity of spatial contacts
bctween objects, He can push an object, but he can be pushed also, The
lIlagical efficacy is diminished, but the differentiation between the subjective
and objective is far from complete and has to be mastered during the next
stagc,
To summarize, then, the sensory motor egocentricity during the first two
years of life implies a lack of differentiation between self and nonself, and a
confusion between the activity of the self and the activity of the external
world, This egocentricity is gradually decentered through a series of cognitive
achievements which include the mastery of object permanence and evolution
of practical space, There is a "miniature Copernican revolution" (14,p,79)
which implies that for the child: (1) objects are external to self and self is
only one object among many objects, and (2) objects exist independently of
the activity of self and objects can act upon self just as self can act upon
objects, Thus we find that the sensory-motor egocentricity becomes
clecentered and a state of equilibrium is reached, But as the child advances to
the next developmental level - the preoperational period - a new form of
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egocentricity will have to be decentered, and a new form of equilibrium will
have to be reached.

Preoperatiollal Egocentricity (2 - 7 years)
The transition from the sensory motor to preoperational level is marked
by the appearance of mental representation or what Piaget prefers to call
"semiotic functions." The semiotic functions include deferred imitation
(imitation in the absence of a model), mental imagery, symbolic play,
drawing, and language. The cognitive functioning on the plane of representation as opposed to the plane of sensory motor action of the previous stage is a
definite advancement over the previous cognitive mode of dealing with
reality. But this itself traps the child in a new form of egocentricity. The
sensory motor child had to master the object; the preoperational child has to
master the symbol or the object symbolized. The sensory-motor child had to
learn to cope with the physical world of permanent objects; the preoperational child has to learn to cope with two new additional worlds - the social
world of people, and his own subjective world of inner representation.
Preoperational cognitive egocentricity, then, implies a lack of differentiation
between the symbol and the thing symbolized, between the inner
psychological world and the outer physical world, and between self and the
social world of people. Piaget has elaborated upon the cognitive egocentricity
of this period at great length in several of his books: Language and Thought
of the Child; Judgment alld Reasoning of the Child; Child's Conception of
Reality; Child's Conception of Physical Causality; Moral Judgment of the
Child; The Psychology of the Child. According to Piaget, the preoperational
egocentricity has two forms: logical egocentricity, and ontological
egocentricity.
Thus there are two forms of egocentricity, the first logical and the second
ontological. Just as the child makes his own truth, so he makes his own reality; he feels
the resistance of matter no more than he feels the difficulty of giving proofs. (l3,p.167)

The first provides the key to the child's judgment and reasoning, and the
second provides the key to the child's conception of reality and causality.

Logical exocentricity, lacking reversibility, reflection, or deduction will be
discussed as:
(a) Intellectual egocentricity,
(b) Linguistic egocentricity, and
(c) Symbolic egocentricity
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Ontological egocentricity

~ill be discussed in relation to the child's con-

cep t 1'on of reality and causalIty.

Logical Egocentricity
..
a. Intellectual egocentrlClty
"The intellectual egocentricity is . . . nothing more than a lack of
coordination, a failure to group relations with other individuals as well as
with other objects." (8,p.61)
The first aspect of intellectual egocentricity manifests itself in the child's
inability to compensate or coordinate differences in two dimensions. The
three classical conservation experiments dealing with mass, weight, and
volume are too well known to be discussed here in detail. It is sufficient to
say that the child bases his judgments on only one dimension, or on one
element of the situation. It is longer, therefore, it is more; or it is higher,
therefore, it is more. The things as they appear have priority over things as
they really are. The child's judgment is perception bound; he looks at static
configurations rather than at transformations. His intuitive reasoning based on
perception lacks reversibility; therefore, he cannot coordinate or compensate
two dimensions in a given situation.
The second aspect of intellectual egocentricity is the child's inability to
view a situation from any other perspective but his own. For example, a
child's judgments about the left and right side of a person seated or standing
opposite to him would be absolute judgments about his own left or right side.
Or in the well-known experiment of the three mountains viewed from
different perspectives, the child's judgments are based on the way the
mountains look from his own particular perspective only. He cannot cope
with the multiplicity of possible perspectives and remains blind to all but his
own perspective, as if that were the only one possible.
The third aspect of intellectual egocentricity is the inability to handle the
logic of relations. "Paul is a boy" remains the same whatever the perspective,
but in statements of brother-sister or brother-brother relationships, two
points of view have to be coordinated at one-and-the-same time. A child will
answer correctly that he has two brothers, Paul and John, but has difficulty
answering correctly how many brothers John or Paul has; he will leave
himself out because he cannot view himself from the position of John or
Paul. If three objects are placed as A, B, C, the child will have no difficulty in
stating that B is in the middle, but will have difficulty making a relative
judgment that B is to the right of A and to the left of C, at one-and-the-same
time. " ... the child fails to grasp the logic of relations for lack of having
established reciprocity, first between himself and other people, and then
between himself and things." (7,p.l97)
The fourth aspect of intellectual egocentricity may be seen in the moral
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reasoning ot the child. In the early stages of moral development, the child has
unilateral respect for the adult and is constrained by adult authority.
Constraint, on the other hand, is always the ally of childish egocentrism. Indeed it
is because the child cannot establish a genuinely mutual contact with the adult that he
remains shut up in his ego. The child is, on the one hand, too apt to have the illusion of
agreement where actually he is following his own fantasy ... (12,p.61)

Lessening of adult authority and increase in mutual respect and
cooperation helps in moral development and decentering of egocentrism.
Also, in making moral judgments about situations involving lying or
dishonesty, a preoperational child disregards the intentions of the wrong doer
and judges an act moral or immoral from the external or material
consequences only. This attitude of objective responsibility in moral
judgments is also an aspect of egocentricity. (12)
b. Linguistic egocentricity
During the preschool period the child has acquired sufficient language to
engage in verbal exchange but surprisingly enough much of the spontaneous
language of the child is egocentric: repetition, monologue, or collective
monologue. After analyzing the spontaneous speech of children over a period
of one month during free play and free activity, Piaget found that 54-60% of
the spontaneous speech of children between 3-5 years of age could be termed
egocentric speech. For children between 5-7 years of age, 44-47% of
spontaneous speech was egocentric. (7,p.206) Most of the time children talk
to themselves, about themselves, as a sort of running commentary accompanying their action, assuming that everybody knows and understands what
they are thinking or talking about. For example, one child will say, "I am
going to put a nail here;" another may say, "I am going to paint the hat red."
They believe that the other person always knows what they are thinking
about and is acquail)ted with their reason for doing so ... " (7,p.28) Very
often the monologue will be sprinkled with "because," "you see," but it is to
be understood that the child talks about his actions to no one in particular.
"To put it quite simply, we may say that the adult thinks socially, even when
he is alone, and that the child under 7 thinks egocentrically, even in the
society of others." (6,p.60). Egocentric speech becomes socialized speech
vis-a-vis others. During play, when children are collaborating in action, a
fight or disagreement may take place. It is solved first by hitting or pushing at
the sensory motor level and only after some time at the symbolic level by
means of a primitive dialogue, when each child will make his own assertions.
It will be some time before there is even an attempt at primitive discussion
when the child will try to communicate or will try to understand the

40

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

. w oint of the other child, or will defend his own point. The egocentric
of the child becomes socialized speech only in social collaboration.
~saareeJ1lents, contradictions, and genuine discussion decenter egocentric
Piaget (11,p.7) recognizes that environmental and situational
Iana U"'aae
"'.
var~ations lllay increase or decrease egocentric speech, and suggests systematic
studies of children's discussions.

vleee~l

c. Symbolic egocentricity
The symbolic play is one of the main activities of the preschool child.
The symbolic play is "the purest form of egocentric and symbolic thought,
and it is the assimilation of reality to the subject's own interest and the
expression of reality through the use of images fashioned by himself."
(8,p.l27)
The symbolic egocentricity implies a lack of differentiation between the
symbol and its referent. Children believe that names are part of the physical
property of objects and that by distorting a name, you distort the object
itself. In their symbolic games, also, the same lack of differentiation between
the symbol and the thing symbolized is quite apparent. When a child pretends
to be father, mother, butterfly or bunny, he is engrossed and enveloped in the
symbol he has created to such an extent that he forgets to be himself.
Symbolic play is, therefore, pure assimilation or incorporation of the external
world into the subjective world of the child; where there are no rules, the
child makes and violates his own rules. By means of symbolic play the child
corrects external reality, resolves conflicts, and "above all, he compensates
for and completes reality by means of a fiction." (14,p.23). When children
create imaginary playmates, they do not differentiate between what is real
and what is imaginary. The imaginary companions are real, who dictate order,
dispense justice and correct reality. The drawings of preoperational children
have a certain element of "transparency." For example, a face in profile will
have two eyes; potatoes will be seen in a man's stomach because he had them
for dinner. Piaget refers to this "transparency" as "intellectual realism" in
children's drawings, in contrast with the visual realism of a more advanced
stage. Piaget explains this as an aspect of egocentricity, because the child
draws what he knows should be there rather than what he sees there. (15)
Logical egocentricity, discussed as intellectual, linguistic, and symbolic is the
key to understanding the limitations and achievements of the preoperational
child's reasoning, thought, language, and play. Limitations are explainable in
terms of cognitive egocentricity, and achievements help in the decentering of
that egocentricity.

Ontological egocentricity: relates to the child's conception of reality and
causality.
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During this period of life the child may pester the adults with "why"
questions or with questions relating to the origin of things.
In order to answer children's questions at their level of understanding, We
must first understand what the child's conception of reality is; and second,
we must understand his particular cognitive mode of dealing with the reality
at that time. Piaget has answered these questions in two of his books: Child's
Conception of Reality, and Child's Conception of Physical Casualty. What is
reality to the child? At the beginning of life there is no distinction between
"the I" and the external world. The self and the world are one, but "a
progressive splitting up of this protoplasmic consciousness into two complementary universes -- the objective and the subjective" constitutes the idea of
reality. (9,p.242) The ontological egocentricity is basically this: the inability
of the child to differentiate between the subjective and the objective universe
resulting in immature concepts of reality and immature judgments about
physical causality. On one hand, mental phenomena are materialized dreams are pictures on the walls, thought is a voice in the mouth, names
reside in the object; on the other hand, physical phenomena are attributed
psychological characteristics - clouds know where they are going, lamp posts
send dreams to annoy us, wind is alive. Through progressive differentiation of
the internal and the external, the realism of the child moves towards
objectivity; but still, the self and the world remain very close. " ... there is
never complete objectivity: at every stage there remain in the conception of
nature what we might call "adherences," fragments of internal experience
which still cling to the external world." (9,p.244) Piaget distinguishes five
forms of "adherences" which confuse child's judgments about physical
causality: (1) Participation - almost magical belief that objects in the
universe participate in human affairs, the sun and the moon follow us; (2)
Animism - endowing life and consciousness to inanimate objects - the wind
is alive; (3) Artificialism - everything is made for man: "the I" is replaced by
"we;" - night comes so we can sleep; apples grow so we can eat them; (4)
Finalism - everything has a function or purpose: rivers have to go to the
ocean, or where else would they go; ships must float on the sea; and (5)
Dynamism - notion of force: things have power almost like the muscular
power of man; the air pushes the clouds.
Piaget has attributed these various manifestations of precausality or
"adherences" to the egocentricity of the child - tht: inability to separate the
inner from the external world. The child sees the world in terms of and with
reference to his own self.
There is thercYore an egocentric logic and an egocentric ontology, of which the
consequences are parallel: they both falsify the perspective of logical relations and of
things, because they both start from the assumption that other people understand us and
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'l'tl' 'is from the first, and that things revolve around us with the sole purpose of
t"
•
'" 'Ill" rcscmblmg us. (9,p.302)

agree \\
"

sCf\'lng

H·"

v

the wry existence of pre causal thinking among children has been de' I 1,,· "nne researchers and upheld by others. Pinard and Laurendeau examine
I1lCU' ' ,"
this is:'u,' Jlld reconcile the differences between Deutsche and Hazlit (who
reject the ;:ollcept) and Dennis and Russell (who uphold it) by concluding
tl;:lt rnctilodoiof!.icai differences in analysis of data confounded the results.
(3,p.l6-2f,) Their own replication of Piaget's research confirms beyond doubt
the existcllc'C uf prccausal thinking and hence of ontological egocentricity.
t)il'

Th,-s,' h,lid's arc manifested with such frequency that they cannot be regarded as
)lIrcll'

indindl1al

(1[

accidental. Out of a total of 500 children, ranging from four to

;II'c!V;' \Cal s of age, 28.6 percent use realistic terms at least once during the examination;

64.-+ pcrcl'!l1, animistic terms; 69.6 percent artificialistic terms; 46.6 percent, dynamistic
tl'llllS: and 'CL6 percent finalistic terms. (3,p.245)

By die' tlIne 1he preoperational child has learned to differentiate between
the psyc!lolugical and the physical (attained objectivity), or has learned to
view a siuulion from a perspective other than his own (attained reciprocity),
or has !earned to differentiate and coordinate multiple perspectives (attained
relativity). the egocentricity has been decentered. He is functioning on a new
cognitiv,' plane --- the plane of concrete operations. The concrete operations,
thcn, art.' instrumental in overcoming the preoperational egocentricity.
COllcrere Operational ~g()centricity (7 ~ 11 + years)
Piaget has devoted vcry little space to discussing the egocentricity of this
period. But if the cognitive development is orderly and continuous, the same
principles of egocentricity, decentering, and equilibrium which apply to other
periods apply to this period also.
The emergence of concrete operations ~ concrete because they are
performed on concrete objects ~ enables the child to do several things which
he was unable to do formerly. For example, he can handle logicomathematical operations such as, numeration, seriation, classification, all of
which involve reversibility_ But this new cognitive achievement imposes its
own limitations and generates its own brand of egocentricity.
The concrete operations are applied to the perceptual "givens" of
here-and-now. So his mental formulations are attached to the empirical
reality only, and are thus limited by it. His thinking is "describer-thinking"
and the direction it takes is from actual to possible. His formulations are
derived from the data; but if some evidence contradicts his formulations, he
either rejects the data or tries to arrange the data to fit his own formulations.
Thus the concrete operational "child often fails to distinguish between his
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or

cuncrete thinking: and secondly, it shows a lack
dillercntiation between
mental formulations derived from data and the data themselves, especially
when contl:HY evidence is presented.

Furma! Opera/ ionaL L~fJou'll triciZY (I 1 + years)
The emergence of formal operations frees the child from the limitations
and egocentricity of connete operations. Reasoning now becomes deductive
based ()n vedxtl hypotheses of it ... , then ... It is capable of taking into
account unllllllted possibilities beyond the data, beyond the here-and-now.
The child C3n now think about thoughts rather than about things that exist Or
he can perform what Piaget cills "second-order" operations. Reflection takes
a round about turn, so to speak, similar to the Copernican revolution of the
sensory motor child. The concrete operational child reasons from what is real
to what is possible: the formal operational child reasons from what is possible
to what is real. Thus there is a complete reversal in the direction which
thinking takes. Reality now becomes one sub-set of N possible sets; formerly,
possibility was simply an extension of reality. "Formal operations provide
thinking with an entirely new ability that detaches and liberates thinking
from concrete reality and permits it to build its own reflections and
theories." (l4,p.63) According to Piaget all preadolescents and adolescents
functioning at formal operational level have their own systems and theories to
reform the world. This idealism is a natural and logical corollary of the
hypothetical-deductive mode of thinking, which is the culmination of
cognitive development. It is the belief in the power of his own reflection
which is at the root of adolescent egocentricity. "It is metaphysical age par
excellence; the self is strong enough to reconstruct the universe and big
enough to incorporate it." (14,p.64) The infant incorporates the universe into
his corporal activities; the preschooler assimilates the world to his symbolic
play; the concrete operational child assimilates it to his empirical formulations, and the adolescent incorporates the world into his grand schemes and
theories. Once again, this supreme pinnacle of human achievement enslaves
the preadolescent in a new kind of egocentricity - the metaphysical
egocentricity. The messianic zeal to save humanity, to reform the world, and
to change the establishment all stem from a cognitive mode of thought which
transcends reality to the endless realm of possibilities. The egocentricity lies
not in dreaming dreams, or formulating theories, or thinking possibilities, but
in not recognizing the limitations which practical considerations of reality
impose on the theoretical possibilities. Metaphysical egocentricity, then is a
lack of differentiation between possibilities engendered by thought, and
limitations imposed by reality. "The metaphysical egocentricity of the
adolescent is gradually lessened as a reconciliation between formal thought
and reality is effected. Equilibrium is attained when the adolescent
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understands lilat the prop~r fun~,tion of reflection is not to contradict but to
redict :[1l<i interpret expenence. (I4,p.64)
P UkiIlLi, in his scholarly essay on "Egocentrism in Children and
Adol es ,": '11," lns interpreted this concept somewhat differently. He states:
I i1:! 'c' U leu to illustrate the egocentric behavior of each major period of
Jcy<?lopmL'nt
particular emphasis upon the egocentrism of middle childhood and
aJo!cSC'L'llc'C' \jw'!l of the material, particularly that on assumptive realities and cognitive
'oncL'it of dlLlui-ag',e children and the imaginary audience and the personal fable of
~JokSCL'"l' " ,pccillativc, in the sense that it is based as much on my clinical experience
with \'lllln~ l'cp,-·k as it is on research data. (l,p.50)

Any rsct of human behavior is complex and multidimensional,
thl'reforc, i11lCl jlrdations "provided by dynamic psychology and psychiatry"
(l.p.5~) Jlld itltel':l:tted insights provided by Piaget, Freud, Bruner, and others
arc fruit r\tl, hut this writer has tried to stay within Piagctian framework in
this essay.
Piagc:\ ~lld lllhdder have referred to the process of equilibration in
several of 1htel[ writings, but more recently at thc opcning of the Jean Piaget
Socic!\' :It rhibdephia in 1971 they elaborated upon this concept more fully
(16), TIllL'<.' cJ:j<;si":dl factors - physical environment, innateness or hereditary
program. "nd soctal transmission (language and education) - have been
generally ~!ccc:pted as pertinent to cognitive development. Piaget has
postulateJ :1 fourth factor, equilibration, which coordinates those three. This
coordination itself is a kind of equilibration. A subject may go through trial
and error, or compensate contradictions, use feedback information, or m"y
resort tel other regulations which are mostly self regulations.
Ther,~ arc reglliations in the course of embryological development, what Waddington calls hc)n1corhesis. At the physiological level, homeostatis is a self-regulatory
mechanism: similarly, in the nervous system, the ret1ex arc is a homeostat. On the level
of human conduct and even at the level of logical operational thinking there are similar
sdf-regll brOI',' mechanisms. (l6,p.l2)

The equilibration process is mostly self regulatory. Equilibrium is the
attained cumpensatioll as a result of self regulation. Piaget insists 011 a
difference between eqUilibration as a process and equilibrium as an attained
state. He discusses three kinds of equilibrium: (l) Equilibrium between
assimilation and accommodation; (2) Equilibrium bctween subsystems; and
(3) Equil iblium between parts and totality of knowledge at a given time (16).
First, the child assimilates and integrates the environmental stimuli to the
eXisting "competencies" and structures and in so doing it accommodates and
modifies these very schemes to environmental stimuli.
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hypotheses and assumptions on the one hand and empirical evidence on the
other. It is this lack of differentiation between assumption and fact that
constitutes the egocentricity of the concrete operational period." (I,p.SS)
The egocentricity of this period has two characteristics: it is limited by
There is a bipolarity, where the Sllbjec1 i' assimilating the object in his schemes and
at the same time accommodating his schemes to the special characteristics of the object.
And in this bi;)ularity and sharing of processes there is already a factor af equilibration
between dssimilation and accommodation. (16,p.2)

In another place Piaget states, "Egocentrism must obviously be defined
not only by primacy of assimilation over accommodation, but by lack of
equilibrium between the two processes, one or other alternately predominating." (lO,p.290)
The second kind of equilibrium refers to the equilibrium between
subsystems. The child may use two systems, e.g. number and length
separately and experience no conflict between numerical and ordinal
reference. But in experiments conducted by Inhelder and associates (16)
where children had to integrate the two systems simultaneously, they
experienced conflict and used self regulatory mechanisms. lnhelder reported
(16) a learning experimen t where subjects had to construct a road "just as
long as" and parallel to the experimenter's road, but with shorter matches. In
this experiment, the self regulatory mechanism of equilibration proceeded
through four steps: (1) No contradiction was felt and children used the two
systems separately; (2) Conscious of the contradiction, they used the two
systems alternately; (3) Inadequate effort at integration and resorting to
compromise solution; and (4) Reciprocal adjustment instead of posthoc
correction. When the two separate subsystems have been integrated or when
equilibrium is attained, the child will explain "you need more matches when
they are small, and the road goes less far but it has zig zags."
The third kind of equilibrium is between parts of knowledge a subject
has and totality of knowledge at a given moment. There is differentiation into
parts and integration of parts back into the whole or the total "structure
d'ensamble." Piaget states that his cognitive equilibrium is quite different
from the equilibrium in physics where it is a question of a balance of forces.
Cognitive equilibrium is a system in which all parts are interdependent - there
is a cycle of interaction among parts and it is open to influences from the
outside. "This equilibrium between the integration and the differentiation of
the parts in the whole has no eqUivalent in physics. It is only found in
biological and cognitive equilibrium." (I6,p.l9)
Each developmental level reflects a genuine and consistent form of
mental organization. In other words, each developmental level has its own
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' eoocentrism or centrism. The sensory motor child has difficulty
bron d of b
.
•

d'fferentiating between self and nonself; the preoperatIOnal child has to
,; aratc the symbol from the thing symbolized; the concrete operational
"l~ld has tll differentiate between the data and the data derived conclusions;
~ d the formal operational child has to distinguish between his abstract
a1I1 'es and practical considerations of reality. Egocentrism increases
t leon
'
. . ..
.
whenever the child has to cope with a new field of cogmhve actIOn, and
'ubsidcs when he has mastered it, only to reassert itself. It is an achievement
, s well as a limitation; equilibrium as well as disequilibrium. The cognitive
~cvelopmcnt over one's life span may be explained by "egocentrism/centrismdcccntrism!cquilibration-equilibrium" model. "The ebb and flow of
t'ooccntrIsm across ontogenetic development is, of course, an expression ahnost a simplified restatement - of the general equilibration model which
Piaget imputes to cognitive evolution ... "(2,p.224)
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